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REVIEW  
 
Sandra Lynch, Philosophy and Friendship (Edinburgh: University of Edin-
burgh Press, 2005) ISBN 0 7486 1727 2.  
 
Sandra Lynch's book is something of a hybrid. On the one hand, it surveys various 
philosophical views of friendship, from Aristotle down through postmodern writers 
such as Derrida and Lacan, stopping along the way to discuss Cicero, Montaigne, 
Kant and Hegel on the master-slave relation, Buber's I-Thou, Sartre on love (since he 
"does not specifically discuss friendship," 69), Bataille, Blanchot, Colin Turnbull's The 
Mountain People (1971), which narrates the dysfunctional society of the Ik tribe of 
Uganda, and many others. She also devotes several pages to Goethe's Elective Affini-
ties, Sándor Márai's Embers, and Toni Morrison's Sula, among other texts, thereby 
taking account of literary treatments of friendship as well as formal philosophical 
analyses. 
On the other hand, Lynch has a thesis of her own to defend on the nature of 
friendship, which her survey is designed to support. The following quotations illu-
strate the main idea of her argument. 
 
Nietzsche, Blanchot and Derrida are theorists of friendship who appreciate the 
place of uncertainty in relations between friends. By comparison with these 
modern theorists, Aristotle avoids the discomfort of uncertainty by aligning the 
socio-political structures of the polis with his ethical prescriptions: the free male 
citizens of the polis are good men united by virtue in the communal civil life of 
the polis. However, the nexus created between the ethical and the social-political 
spheres of life determines that Aristotelian civic friendship obscures the demand 
for indirection in friendship as well as the recognition of difference between 
friends (101). 
 
More specifically, "Aristotelian civic friendship simply conceals the possibility that 
citizens may have differing conceptions of what constitutes the good for the com-
munity of which they are members" (107). The ancient view of friendship, 
represented by Aristotle, Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, Montaigne, and others, put the 
emphasis on social unity, and hence treated friendship as primarily a relationship 
among the better class of people, who held a common view about the society and the 
nature of the good. Modern, or at all events postmodern views, on the contrary, 
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stress difference and the ultimate uncertainty that inhabits friendship. According to 
the modern view, which Lynch evidently shares, "friends have the potential to re-
spond to one another in unreserved and inventive ways" (145). Allying herself with 
the approach of object-relations psychologists such as Donald Winnicott and Heinz 
Kohut, Lynch affirms that "the process of constituting a self is a precarious one 
which places us in an ambiguous relation to the other" (151). But we need others, 
nevertheless, to achieve selfhood as it is understood by thinkers such as Jacques La-
can: "the ability to take account of the perceptions and expectations of others is cru-
cial to the development of a coherent or stable conception of self". Lynch uses "psy-
choanalytic perspectives on the formation of identity and the constitution of the self 
... to emphasise the creativity that is implicit in relations between friends. Friendship 
emerges as a creative and uncertain synthesis of the play of forces that create identi-
ty and difference between friends" (165). This, finally, is Lynch's strategy for defeat-
ing Derrida's insistence on "the impossibility of any complete or sustained connec-
tion between friends" (95), given that "the possibility of friendship rests on our ac-
ceptance of a fiction ... of connection" (93). For "the connection between friends can 
be seen as one that is intersubjectively created and nurtured" (187)—it resides in a 
process of maturation and self-formation, and if the result is a "fragile connection," it 
is friendship for all that. 
Such is the gist of Lynch's argument. The ancient or classical view, associated 
principally with Aristotle, serves as a foil to the modern: whereas Aristotle stresses 
identity among friends, and obscures "the recognition of difference between friends" 
in the service of a larger ideal of civic solidarity, the modern view acknowledges and 
indeed relishes difference, both on the personal and the social level: Lynch adduces 
Georg Simmel for the view that "modern culture, society and personality are by na-
ture fragmented" (166). But if ancient and modern societies are indeed so different, 
and so too, correspondingly, the dominant conception of friendship in each, it is legi-
timate to ask whether Aristotle, Derrida, and Winnicott are talking about the same 
thing when they speak of "friendship". The very decision to translate a term into 
another language as "friendship" already presupposes a view about what the idea 
means for the speakers of that language. The Greek term philia, which is often trans-
lated as "friendship," basically means "love"; it only signifies "friendship" in contexts 
in which love obtains among those designated as friends (in Greek, philoi), as dis-
tinct from kin, spouses, or amatory (including pederastic) relations. Latin amicitia, 
however, specifically means "friendship." Love of all sorts, whether familial or erotic, 
was amor in Latin; in Greek, however, passionate love was designated by the term 
erôs. Thus, when Lynch equates erôs with philia (12-13), I see a red flag: although 
Aristotle says the erotic passion an adult man feels for a boy may turn into friend-
ship when the boy matures, provided he has a suitably virtuous character, the two 
categories were distinct in classical Greek. 
Leaving aside technical points of philology, one may inquire whether earlier 
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views of friendship, which are predicated upon such disparate conceptions of the 
self and society, can have anything to offer us moderns. Lynch affirms, rather surpri-
singly: "Putting aside the criticisms of Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of friend-
ship, my argument is that both philosophers provide a theoretical structure for the 
maintenance of relations in the broader social context within which intimacy devel-
ops" (108). Very possibly, but this idea is not (so far as I can tell) put to use in 
Lynch's discussion of modern friendship. Indeed, if ancient and modern societies are 
as different as Lynch says, it is difficult to see how Aristotle's or Kant's theories con-
cerning social relations can be of much help, or how such disparate views of friend-
ship can illuminate one another; I had the sense, as I followed Lynch's discussion, 
that they simply pass each other by, as though Aristotle and Derrida were speaking 
different languages (which of course they are). 
I believe that Lynch is broadly right to hold that Aristotle's conception of 
friendship was conditioned, at least in part, by his vision of a society run by virtuous 
men, and that postmodern notions of friendship are, on the contrary, disposed to 
celebrate difference, although I do not share Lynch's view that developmental psy-
chology can help resolve the paradoxes of friendship that Derrida identifies. Never-
theless, I am afraid that she sometimes misrepresents the classical view, and more 
particularly that of Aristotle and Cicero, which allows more scope for difference, in-
timacy, and self-development than Lynch concedes. In what follows, I shall concen-
trate on these two thinkers, but before proceeding, I must indicate a certain parti 
pris. I am the author of a book entitled Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge, 
1997), not mentioned by Lynch, in which I discuss friendship in a wide context, in-
cluding philosophical treatments. What is more, my views, while respectable 
enough, are not universally shared. Some of Lynch's comments on ancient friend-
ship reflect interpretations advanced by other scholars with which I disagree. I can-
not in the space of this review present all the arguments on either side of these dis-
putes, but the reader should be alert to the fact that such differences exist, and de-
serve to be recognized. 
To take an example from a non-philosophical text: I do not agree with 
Lynch's claim that in Homer we find "a relatively unquestioning depiction of friend-
ship as a formal relationship" (7), and that "relations between warrior-chieftains did 
not involve ties of an emotional kind" (9). The relationship between Achilles and Pa-
troclus, the principal friends in the Iliad, is intensely emotional, as Lynch herself ob-
serves (11). Lynch is here following a conception, which I regard as dated though 
many scholars still subscribe to it, according to which Greek philia, whether in Hom-
er or later, had an objective, quasi-contractual character. So too, when Lynch avers 
that "amicitia was once used interchangeably with factio to refer to a band of friends" 
(55-56), but that it degenerated into the sense of mere political faction, she is appeal-
ing to the view promoted more than half a century ago by Lily Ross Taylor, but deci-
sively refuted (as I believe) by Peter Brunt, who demonstrated that party loyalties 
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seem to have had virtually no impact at all on the formation or dissolution of friend-
ships in ancient Rome. 
Proceeding now to philosophical treatments, Lynch observes that Aristotle 
identifies three types of friendship, predicated on recognition of virtue in the other, 
or else "motivated by the friend's usefulness or pleasure to me, rather than by con-
cern for the friend's good" (16). I maintain, however, that for Aristotle all three kinds 
of friendship involve concern for the welfare of the other. Indeed, in the definition of 
friendship that Aristotle provides in the Rhetoric (2.4), as opposed to his ethical trea-
tises, he affirms: "Let to philein [loving] be wishing for someone the things that he 
deems good, for the sake of that person and not oneself, and the accomplishment of 
these things to the best of one's ability"; and he adds: "A philos is one who loves and 
is loved in return". This is a description of love generally, not just that based on 
appreciation of virtue. The affection that arises as a result of mutual commerce, for 
example, is still a kind of love; to be sure, it is less durable than virtue friendship, but 
while it lasts it entails (in my view) caring for the friend, just like friendships formed 
in the workplace today. Lynch observes: "Modern individuals might feel a degree of 
affection for business associates or work colleagues and yet not regard them as 
friends" (17); true enough, but so too might ancient Greeks. Aristotle nowhere sug-
gests that all persons who are useful to each other are, by that token, friends. 
Was Aristotle's conception of friendship conditioned by the social world of 
the classical city-state, which he saw, according to Lynch, as "an arena of like-
minded citizens who agree about their interests, adopt the same policy and act on 
their common resolutions" (24)? There is no doubt that Aristotle valued concord or 
homonoia among the citizen body, and that he believed that a kind of communal af-
fection or friendly feeling went a good way toward securing civic solidarity. Lynch 
supposes that such an ideal, involving "a harmony of interests, ideas and activities," 
is one that "we today would regard as impossible" (ibid.). It is true enough that we 
do not typically speak of friendship as the bond between fellow citizens, but we do 
refer to brotherhood in this connection, precisely in order to emphasize equality of 
rights and a kind of familial warmth of feeling. Lynch also finds problematic Aris-
totle's emphasis on regard for virtue as a basis of friendship or love: "From the pers-
pective of the modern reader it seems that in Aristotle's highest form of friendship 
we like our friend for the sake of his goodness—rather than for himself" (27). Lynch 
notes that any account of why we like someone "suggests liking for the sake of some-
thing else"; this is in contrast with what she identifies as the modern view, "that 
friends are loved for what it is that makes them unique" (28), a fuzzy concept that 
hardly lends itself to analysis at all. I agree on the latter point, but Aristotle makes it 
clear that, for friendship to arise, one must have intimate knowledge of the other, 
deriving from long acquaintance; he also specifies that one can have only a very few 
friends, whereas, were regard for virtue the only factor, we should be friends with 
all the virtuous people we know. 
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Finally, I differ with Lynch's interpretation of the role of maternal love in 
Aristotle (32): this love is, according to Aristotle, natural (he uses the term phusei, "by 
nature"): animals too experience it, whereas they do not form friendships based on 
regard for virtue or utility. Whether parental love "provides the child with a sense 
that she is loved for her own sake" (34) is perhaps questionable, but it does offer a 
model of unconditional affection, in which respect it differs from friendship, which 
responds to causes. 
Turning briefly to Cicero, it is true that Cicero recognized that politics could 
divide friends, at least if it came to the point of seriously endangering the republic, 
for example participating in or covering up a conspiracy out of loyalty to one's com-
rades; but this does not mean that Cicero shared the Epicurean credo of abstention-
ism in regard to politics (54). On the contrary, Cicero was both active in politics and 
maintained friendships with people of all political stripes, even in the dire condi-
tions of civil war. Nor would I say that Cicero's ideal of concordia was "based on a 
similarity of rights" (55): it is debated whether there existed a concept of "rights" in 
classical antiquity, but for Cicero, at all events, concordia was first and foremost a re-
lationship across class lines. The concordia ordinum that he sought to foster was hie-
rarchical rather than egalitarian. 
Lynch covers, as I have indicated, a great deal of territory in this book, with 
the result that the argument sometimes races over points that in my view deserve 
more attention. Treating the various conceptions of friendship from Aristotle on 
down as the prolegomenon to an argument about the nature of modern friendship 
further complicates the presentation. Whether modern friendship is predicated on 
an acknowledgment of difference and the development of a stable self through mu-
tual exchange and recognition is in my view moot, but more could have been done 
to historicize this notion, which is very much a product of our own culture. While it 
is not for me to dictate the book that Lynch should have written, I could have 
wished that she had conceived her task in this more critical vein. 
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